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Introduction
Markets in developing countries are characterized by a broad range of failures that adversely affect the individual actors and challenge the institutions created to mediate their interactions in the marketplace (Stiglitz, 1989; Besley, 1994) . Factor markets, like several other markets in developing countries, are subject to widespread inefficiencies resulting from incomplete information and imperfect contract enforcement, exacerbated by unclear property rights and subsequent high transaction costs (Stiglitz and Weis, 1981; Collier, 1983; Stiglitz, 1989; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; de Janvry et al., 1991; Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2008; Pender and Fafchamps, 2006) .
Nowhere are these problems more critical than in land, labor, and rural credit markets of developing countries. These three types of markets are particularly thin and inhibited by problems of information asymmetry. As a result, moral hazard, adverse selection, and related opportunistic behaviors are common, since transactions in these markets require extensive information for screening, monitoring, and contract enforcement. Information asymmetry in these markets results in transaction costs that are high, as monitoring and penalizing opportunistic behavior is difficult. The failure of factor markets imply that "either the transactions simply do not occur, or substitute institutions emerge to allow the transaction to take place" (de Janvry et al., 1991) . A vast amount of literature points to such failures in these markets giving rise to traditional institutional arrangements and social networks playing critical roles in filling the gaps in exchanges of goods, services, and factors of production that markets fail to deliver (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Rosenzweig, 1988; Udry, 1990) . One line of literature studies the widespread use of land and labor sharing contracts in developing countries in the face of risk and missing insurance markets (e.g. Johnson, 1950; Cheung, 1969) and imperfect monitoring of labor efforts (e.g., Newbery, 1975) . These studies point to incentives, risk pooling, and the production efficiency advantage of land and labor sharing arrangements. Pender and Fafchamps (2006) point out that social relationships -capitalizing on pre-existing trust and thereby reducing transaction costs of monitoring -play important roles in determining land and labor contract arrangements.
A similar line of literature studies how information asymmetry undermines the operations and effectiveness of rural credit markets in developing countries. Empirical evidence, following the seminal work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , points to such information asymmetry in rural credit markets limiting lenders from writing effective contracts because, in the absence of information regarding the characteristics and activities of their clientele, formal lenders find it difficult to discern their potential borrower types in these areas (Udry, 1990; Aryeetey and Udry, 1997) . In the absence of formal credit, households often rely on credit from their informal networks to smooth consumption (Fafchamps, 2006; Rosenzweig, 1988; Townsend, 1995; Fafchamps and Lund, 1998) . Informal credit often involves trust-based self-enforcing informal networks and relationships which are typically characterized by flexibility in credit allocation and repayment (Udry, 1990; Fafchamps, 2006) . In most rural communities, these activities are organized in some form of traditional social networks that provide group-based informal insurance, like iddirs in Ethiopia. These institutions perform a crucial function for rural households in overcoming important market imperfections by expediting the flow of information within and beyond the village (Udry, 1990; Barr, 2000) , reducing monitoring and enforcement costs (Sadoulet et al., 1997; Berhane et al., 2009; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Karlan, 2007) , and developing trust among agents (Fukuyama, 1995; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) .
There is a large empirical literature on the formation, prevalence, and role of social networks in dealing with a wide spectrum of socio-economic problems, including risk and consumption smoothing (Udry, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Okten and Osili, 2004; Hoddinott et al., 2005; Hoddinott et al., 2009; Wydick et al., 2011; Ali and Deininger, 2014; Ali et al., 2014) ; credit, saving and transaction costs (Dercon et al., 2006; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006) ; and technology adoption, insurance, and productivity (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Barr, 2000; Conley and Udry, 2002; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Krishnan and Sciubba, 2009 ). However, little is known about the explicit roles of social networks in mitigating factor market imperfections, and, hence, their role in facilitating factor market transactions among smallholder farmers.
In this paper, we study the role of an indigenous social network in Ethiopia, iddir associations, in overcoming factor market imperfections to facilitate factor transactions among smallholder farmers.
Iddir is the most inclusive and widespread social network in Ethiopia, commonly established by community members, neighbors, or among friends and families. The origin of iddir as a social network is to provide funeral services and to support bereaved family members morally and financially (see for instance, Dercon et al., 2006) . However, a closer look at iddir networks reveals their scope to go beyond funeral associations, as they are involved in many socio-economic issues (Pankhurst and Mariam, 2000; Mariam, 2003; Dercon et al., 2006) . By offering informal social insurance, information, and trust among members, iddir associations share the main micro-level properties of other networks (Caeyers and Dercon, 2012) . However, very little is known about how iddir networks contribute to the economic activity of their members. Dercon et al. (2006; 2008) studied the role of iddir networks as funeral and insurance institutions, while Hoddinott et al. (2005) investigated the role of iddir networks as risk coping mechanisms. Investigating the roles of social networks in ameliorating market imperfections in the Ethiopian case provides an interesting context given the coexistence of such social networks and evidence of pervasive market failures and their associated high transaction costs in rural Ethiopia (Deininger et al., 2008; Deininger and Jin, 2008; Ghebru and Holden, 2008) .
We use longitudinal household survey data from Ethiopia to investigate the role of iddir networks in facilitating factor market transactions among farmers. To circumvent estimation and identification problems associated with households' self-selection into network membership, we exploit the longitudinal feature of the data and use a difference-in-differences approach. We find that iddir membership improves household's access to factor market transactions in a range of 7 to 11 percentage points. Specifically, we find that iddir membership improves households' sharecropping and labor-sharing practices, as well as their access to credit. Interestingly, our findings also indicate that iddir networks crowd-out borrowings from village moneylenders (locally referred to as Arata Abedari), who often provide expensive credit due to the screening, monitoring, and contract enforcement problems that can be removed by social networks. However, our findings suggest that membership in these networks does not crowd-out borrowing from formal credit sources that offer both relatively cheaper and larger amounts of credit. These results are robust to various empirical specifications and robustness checks. These substantial effects potentially work through households' privileged access to key resources that iddir networks avail to their members ranging from enabling the flow of information among members and, thereby, building trust, up to penalizing opportunistic behavior through provisions of strict rules and social sanctions. The results of this analysis are important in at least two ways. First, while much of economics continues to rely on assumptions of market-based solutions to imperfections (Fafchamps, 2004:3-21) , these results suggest that non-market institutions also can play crucial roles in intermediating transactions whenever contracts are not perfectly enforceable due to lack of information or efficient court systems. Second, they further suggest that the outcomes of government intervention to improve market performance in these contexts is not straightforward. Care must be taken not to crowd-out the role these institutions are bound to play in facilitating local exchange (Dercon et al., 2006) . The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional features of iddir networks in Ethiopia. Section 3 presents a brief exposition of factor markets in Ethiopia, while Section 4 discusses the data and empirical models used for this analysis. In section 5, we present and discuss the empirical results, while Section 6 provides concluding remarks and policy implications.
Institutional Features of Iddir Networks In Ethiopia
Iddir is the most inclusive and widespread type of social network in Ethiopia, prevalent both in rural and urban settings and inclusive of gender, wealth, education, religion, and ethnicity (Pankhurst, 2008) .
Originally, iddir networks were established to provide financial (cash) and other types of support (in kind) when a family member dies. These networks also assume a key role in facilitating the burial and funeral of the deceased member. However, a close look at iddir networks reveals that they go beyond funeral associations as they are involved in many socio-economic issues. Iddirs provide small credit for their members, often without collateral (Dercon et al., 2006) ; help unemployed members (Pankhurst and Mariam 2000) ; finance their members' health care expenditures (Mariam, 2003) ; provide financial assistance when their members suffer from other shocks (Dercon et al., 2006) ; and in recent years, iddir networks provide insurance for death of key livestock, such as oxen.
Iddir networks often have well-defined and written rules (Dercon et al., 2006) . Membership is on a voluntary basis and is commonly open to all members living in a village (Hoddinott et al., 2005; Dercon et al., 2006; Mariam, 2003) .
1 Hoddinott et al. (2005) and Mariam (2003) report that the majority of iddirs in Ethiopia have no restrictions on membership and that all villages in their study samples hosted at least one iddir that was open to anyone living in the village. Members are required to pay a monthly contribution, while new members may have to pay an entrance fee. Membership fees in most iddirs are relatively small and provide some flexibility in payment due dates, and hence, most interested potential members are able to join. Dercon et al. (2006) report that the average monthly household contribution to iddirs in their sample amounted to 1.64 Birr (0.08 USD), which is too small to dictate participation in these networks. In addition, most iddirs have flexible conditions for the 1 See Pankhurst and Mariam (2000) for an exhaustive list of types of iddir associations in Ethiopia.
membership of the very poor, accepting non-monetary contributions and sometimes allowing people to become members free of charge (Pankhurst and Mariam, 2000; Mariam, 2003) .
Previous studies show that individual and household wealth indicators have insignificant effects on iddir membership. For example, Dercon et al. (2006) find that, while age and household size affects the probability of becoming a member, wealth, land, and livestock holdings had no effect.
Richer households could obtain better coverage against risk by joining multiple iddir networks, and perhaps by joining iddir associations established in rich neighborhoods. As suggested by Hoddinott et al. (2005) , the income and wealth status of a household could affect the intensity of participation in iddirs, but income and wealth are found to have an insignificant effect in defining the extensive margin of participation in these egalitarian associations. This evidence sets an interesting context to evaluate the effectiveness of such an inclusive social network in facilitating factor market transactions among households.
Like many other social networks, iddir associations provide informal social insurance and information and strengthen trust among members of the association (Caeyers and Dercon, 2012).
Besides providing linkages among members, iddirs reduce transaction costs and provide security against shirking or defection in the absence of formal contractual agreements. Rigorous empirical evidence as to whether these qualities of iddir networks are important to facilitate factor market transactions among smallholder farmers and to complement imperfect agricultural markets in rural economies is not yet available.
Factor Markets In Ethiopia
As in many other developing countries, rural areas of Ethiopia are characterized by imperfect or missing factor markets (Deininger et al., 2008; Deininger and Jin, 2008; Ghebru and Holden, 2008) . In Ethiopia, land belongs to the state and landlords are only entitled to user rights. Under this form of ownership, landowners are not entitled to sell, transfer, or mortgage their land. Pender and Fafchamps (2006) point out that, in the absence of land redistribution, the only means of acquiring access to land in Ethiopia is through gifts, borrowing, fixed-rental, or sharecropping. They find that the latter is the most prevalent form of securing access to land. Sharecropping is a tenancy agreement between landowners and their tenants. It evolves on the premise that tenants share a portion of the harvested production with the landowner depending on their agreement, usually half or two-third of gross production (see, for instance, Pender and Fafchamps, 2006) . In some cases, landowners contribute some production inputs, generally draft-animal (oxen) or labor. In contrast, in fixed land rentals, the tenant pays a fixed amount of money, commonly in advance and assumes ownership of the land and the harvested production for the agreed production season.
Similarly, the agricultural labor market in Ethiopia lacks formality. Labor transactions depend on traditional labor-sharing practices, which mainly involve paired-borrowing of labor between farming households in return for similar labor on another day (or season). As discussed in Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) , labor-sharing practices in Ethiopia may also involve large-scale labor borrowing from a large number of households, which may be returned when a similar event is organized by contributing households. These practices sometimes exploit the seasonal variation in demand for labor among households in the crop planting, growing, and harvesting periods. For instance, if a household's crops are not ready for harvest, the household continues to credit labor to other households who are in demand for it and gets the labor back when its crops are ready for harvest.
Such traditional arrangements in local land and labor markets also extend to rural credit markets in Ethiopia. Despite recent progress, Ethiopia's agricultural credit market is not yet well developed. Rural credit is predominantly covered by informal loan arrangements, including moneylenders, and exhibits the same screening, incentive, and enforcement problems found in many rural credit markets in developing countries (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Udry, 1990 ).
To sum up, factor markets in Ethiopia are incomplete and are dominated by traditional arrangements. Most of these arrangements or transactions do not involve formal contractual agreements. Thus, their validity hinges on informal relationships and trust among agents. In the presence of these imperfect factor markets, investigating the role of iddir networks is crucial in designing alternative policy measures that aim at improving factor markets in agriculture. Social networks play a key role in trust formation (Fukuyama, 1995; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) and information sharing (Barr, 2000) . These qualities of social networks offer an interesting context to reduce information asymmetry among agents of rural factor markets, and hence, facilitate factor market transactions among farmers.
In this paper, we empirically investigate the role of iddir, an indigenous social network in Ethiopia, in easing factor market imperfections in rural economies. We are specifically interested in investigating households' factor market transaction dynamics when they join iddir networks. We hypothesize that iddir networks improve poorly functioning factor markets in rural Ethiopia and, hence, improve smallholder farmers' access to these markets. When information asymmetry is binding and lack of trust and reputation limits potential efficiency improvements in factor markets, iddir networks can serve as information hubs where households can exchange information relevant to their input endowment. Furthermore, and most importantly, the network built through iddir associations serves as a safety net (insurance) and a basis for stronger reciprocity among members.
More specifically, we hypothesize that iddir networks can bridge the information and reputation related gaps between those who would like to acquire access to land or labor and those who would like to provide these factors through land or labor sharing agreements. Likewise, iddir networks can also improve households' access to credit specifically from other iddir members by minimizing information asymmetry, thereby further strengthening trust among members. Furthermore, through their informational resource advantage, iddir members may even enjoy better access to factor markets that involve transactions with non-members. Since iddirs are formed among residents of (and often limited to) the same village, we expect that iddir membership may specifically improve households' access to credit from neighbors and friends, who are more likely to be from the same village. In contrast, we expect that iddir membership could potentially crowd-out access to credit from moneylenders who, on account of the relatively high risk and transaction cost involved, charge higher interest rates. Although iddirs may not have a clearly defined legal basis to enforce market transactions, they are observed to be guided by sound set rules to which members can appeal in case of default, even if loans are made one-to-one without the institutional involvement of the iddir. In addition, these rules are strengthened through the social leverage that iddirs and their leaders are bestowed from members.
These include group pressure and social penalties on individuals that fail to comply with agreed terms between members, similar to the roles played by community leaders in northern Nigeria to overcome loan enforcement problems (Udry, 1990) .
Data and Econometric Method

Data source and sample description
The data we use for this study comes from a longitudinal household survey collected to evaluate the (2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) were conducted with the sample households with two-year gaps. A more detailed exposition on the sampling design is given in Berhane et al. (2011) . Table 1 presents the distribution of iddir membership across the surveys from the four main regions covered in the longitudinal survey. Some previous studies that focus on specific regions where iddir networks are particularly prevalent report higher iddir participation than are seen in our sample (Hoddinott et al., 2005; Dercon et al., 2006) . 3 A closer look at Table 1 suggests that iddir membership increases across the surveys, ranging from 51 percent in the first (2006) survey to 66 percent in the third (2010) survey. This generally increasing trend may be attributed to the increasing demand for the services that these networks provide and the concurrent expansion of the networks. This is not surprising given the increase in the recurrence of drought and other idiosyncratic shocks in rural Ethiopia in recent years and that membership in an iddir network can directly or indirectly mitigate such shocks for a household. The increment is particularly large between the two middle surveys. Thus, we focus on these two middle surveys in this study. However, we also use information from the first (2006) and fourth (2012) surveys to corroborate and test our identification strategy. In terms of timing, both middle surveys were conducted at similar times: The 2008 survey was fielded between late May and early July, while the 2010 survey was fielded in June and July. Detailed descriptive statistics of the variables in these two surveys is given in Table A1 in the Appendix. Though the data is not collected for the purpose of investigating the role of iddirs, the sampling design is well-suited for our purpose for the following reasons: First, iddir participation is unrelated to PSNP selection and its targeting criteria (or determinants). We perform some empirical exercises to investigate if indeed iddir participation is not directly determined by some observed livelihood characteristics that define PSNP participation. Thus, we explore the association between iddir membership and PSNP participation as well as other observable characteristics that may affect PSNP participation, including wealth status, income, food security status, and other observed socioeconomic variables. Table 2 presents these results. In the first column, we regress the propensity to join an iddir on different observable characteristics of households, including wealth, income, food security status, social status and other socio-demographic variables. The second and third columns extend this specification by including zone-level and woreda-level fixed effects, respectively. 4 The results indicate Furthermore, recent studies that evaluated the PSNP point out that PSNP selection is largely based on assets, income, and food security status, which we tried to control for using observable household characteristics in our regressions (Andersson et al., 2009; Gilligan et al., 2009; Berhane et al., 2011; Berhane et al., 2014) .
Second, though indigenous social networks such as iddirs are not well-researched in Ethiopia, the few existing studies indicate that iddir networks are inclusive and open to all interested members of the community (Hoddinott et al., 2005; Dercon et al., 2006; Mariam, 2003) . The fact that iddir networks are inclusive and uncorrelated with household wealth indicators has important implications for our identification strategy. The share of iddir membership for the balanced panel sample of 2,293 households for both middle surveys estimated in Table 2 is almost identical to the full sample figures in Table 1 . 6 In 2008,
59
.6 percent of sample households were members of iddir networks, while the corresponding rate in 2010 is 67.5 percent. Other details and trends of the variables across both surveys are given in Table   A1 those households that remained non-members in both surveys. We exploit this variation in iddir membership status across both surveys to identify the role of iddir networks in factor market transactions. Specifically, we compare the change in households' participation in factor market transactions between those who joined iddir networks after the 2008 survey and those who remained non-members in both surveys, before and after the former joined iddir networks. Observing the increasing trend in Table 1 and simple correlations in Table 2 , we expect that this switching is either exogenous to our outcomes of interest or driven by factors that are dealt with in our estimation strategy.
This comparison enables us to remove any time-invariant selection into iddir membership.
Furthermore, in some of our specifications we employ time-varying controls that may induce iddir participation. For convenience, we label the 345 households who joined iddir networks after 2008 as our treatment group, while those 581 households who remained non-members in both surveys are control group households.
Outcome variables of interest
We are interested in investigating the role of iddir networks in complementing the poorly functioning agricultural land, labor, and credit markets. We are particularly interested in investigating households' factor market (land, labor, and credit) transaction dynamics when they join social networks that provide them information, linkages, and social capital. As discussed in Section 3, we hypothesize that iddir networks can improve households' access to sharecropping land. Similarly, we are also interested in examining the impact of iddir networks in facilitating labor-sharing practices. As discussed in Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) , there are different types of labor-sharing practices in Ethiopia that involve varying numbers of participants. Here our focus is on a specific type of labor-sharing practice that commonly involves symmetric reciprocation of labor among parties involved in the network.
Finally, we aim to estimate the impact of iddir networks in facilitating credit transactions among farmers and, hence, their role in easing liquidity constraints of smallholder farmers. We are particularly interested in estimating how iddir networks affect credit flow from friends and neighbors, those individuals who are expected to be members of the iddir network. 7 Furthermore, we investigate whether iddir networks crowd-out expensive credit sources. By providing alternative sources of credit, we expect that iddir networks may crowd-out households' credit from local moneylenders who charge high interest rates. 8 Table 3 provides a list of the outcome variables of interest in this study and their summary statistics measured at the pre-treatment period (2008) . Consistent with the literature on social networks, we generally expect that the potentially untapped role of iddir networks in factor market exchanges mainly works through trust formation, information sharing, and reducing enforcement costs that can instrumentally smooth the flow of transactions. Furthermore, these networks involve social 7 Although some iddir associations provide soft loans to their members, this accounts for less than 1 percent in our data. Our focus is restricted to the indirect role of iddir networks in facilitating credit access from neighbors and friends. 8 If iddir associations also include relatives, the effect of iddir membership on households' credit access from relatives may improve. However, in practice, iddir formation is heavily affected by neighborhood and friendship, rather than familial relationships.
support that enables them to impose strong social sanctions on households who defect, which is an effective tool and guarantee for members of the network. Table 3 shows that both treatment and control group households have statistically similar pretreatment factor market transactions for many of our outcome variables. Before households in the treatment group joined an iddir, the degree of involvement in factor market transactions for both the treatment and control group households was fairly similar. This helps our identification strategy, ensuring that we are comparing similar households. More specifically, around 7 percent of the treatment group households sharecropped-in land in the base year (2008), while the corresponding rate for those control group households is 10 percent. Similarly, Table 3 shows that more than 50 percent of households borrowed at least 20 Birr in the previous 12 months. 9 The most common source of credit was relatives, friends and neighbors, micro-finance institutions, and informal moneylenders (Arata Abedari). The distributions of these sources of credit are statistically comparable across the treatment and control group households, except for credit from informal sources. Notes: Column 1 and 2 present the mean factor market transactions for the treatment and control group households in the base year (2008) (with standard deviations in parentheses), while column 3 presents mean differences between both groups. In Panel A, we compare land transactions between both groups, while Panel B and C make a similar comparison for labor and credit transactions, respectively. ***, **, * indicate that differences are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Econometric method and identification strategy
As discussed in Section 4.1, we exploit the variation in iddir membership across both surveys (2008 and 2010) to empirically identify the effect of this indigenous network in facilitating factor market exchanges. We use a difference-in-differences approach and compare factor market transactions of households that joined iddir networks (treatment group) with those non-member households (control group), before and after the former joined iddir networks. Such an identification strategy helps us to cancel out time-invariant selection into iddir membership based on some time-invariant unobservable factors. Furthermore, to capture some time-varying factors that might induce iddir participation, we control for households' time-varying demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as well as their exposure to shocks. Note that iddir networks are formed with the aim of supporting members in case of death in the household or another type of idiosyncratic shock. These shocks can drive some dynamics in factor market transaction, and those households who recently suffered death of a family member or other type of shock might be more likely to join these networks. Thus, we need to explicitly control for shocks that may induce iddir participation. More explicitly, we estimate the following difference-in- Table A2 in Appendix) unambiguously confirm this argument. These estimates, along with the comparable pre-treatment factor market transactions shown in Table 3 , suggest that our treatment effects are not driven by some sort of selection based on unobserved heterogeneity among the treated and control group households.
Since all our outcome variables of interest are binary response outcomes, we estimate equation
(1) using linear panel data models and probit models. We rigorously attempt different specifications of the covariates, including some non-linear effects of the variables. As mentioned earlier, the intensity and prevalence of iddir networks can vary across woredas, and perhaps across villages. Thus, we also control for village-level fixed effects in some of our specifications. 10 For each factor market (land, labor, and credit), we estimate equation (1) without any control, with controls, and with village-level fixed effects. We estimate equation (1) for two land transaction outcomes of interest: probability of sharecropping-in and sharecropping-out of land in the main (meher) season. Similarly, we estimate equation (1) for households' tendency to participate in labor-sharing practices in the main season.
Finally, we estimate equation (1) for modeling households' credit access from neighbors and friends, as well as their credit access from local moneylenders. For each of these estimations, we present treatment effects estimated through linear regression models and marginal effects from probit models. Not surprisingly, the treatment effects from the linear regression models are very comparable with the implied marginal effects from the probit models.
Estimation Results and Discussion
In this section, we present and discuss the main results. Table 4 presents the estimation results for the land transactions of households: sharecropping-in and sharecropping-out practices. Columns 1 to 3 present the estimation results for household's propensity to participate in sharecropping-in practices considering different specifications. In the first column, we present estimates without controls, while in the second column we control for demographic and socio-economic variables. In the third column, we extend the specification by controlling village level-fixed effects. Similarly, columns 4 to 6 of Table 4 present the estimation results for households' participation in sharecropping-out practices without controls, with controls, and with village-level fixed effects, respectively. Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations for household's involvement in land transactions. The second and fifth columns include four regional dummy variables corresponding to the main regions of Ethiopia. Estimates on the third and sixth columns additionally include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
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Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation.
Consistent with our hypothesis, iddir membership causally improves households' probability to participate in land markets through share tenancy, particularly by enabling them to enter into sharecropping arrangements, the most common and vibrant forms of land tenancy contracts in Ethiopia (Pender and Fafchamps, 2005) . Specifically, joining iddir networks improves households' probability 11 Full set of estimates for all variables in the various specifications are given in Table A3 in the appendix.
to acquire access to land through sharecropping-in by about 9 percentage points, while also symmetrically improving landlords' probability to sharecrop/loan-out their land by around 6 percentage points. These results are quantitatively strong and stable over alternative specifications and robustness checks. Particularly, these estimates are robust to the inclusion of many covariates and village levelfixed effects. These estimates suggest that iddir networks do indeed bridge the gap between those who would like to offer their land for others to cultivate (for various reasons, including efficiency and risk pooling considerations) and those who would like to acquire access to land lease through share tenancy. This is particularly appealing in the Ethiopian context where formal land markets are inhibited by legal restrictions on land sales market; alternative tenancy mechanisms are subject to production risk, shirking on labor effort, and high cost of monitoring; and there are significant imperfections in other factor markets (e.g., seed and fertilizers). These estimates can plausibly be attributed to the role of iddir networks in reducing factor market inefficiency resulting from information asymmetry between demanders and suppliers of land, as well as to their role as a safety net by providing security and trust for agents interested in land transactions. As discussed in Section 2, iddir members meet regularly for general meetings or when members face idiosyncratic shocks. These kinds of events allow members to discuss their general activities and share information, including those relevant to their demand and supply of factor markets. This in turn, reduces search costs, reduces potential land use inefficiency due to information asymmetry, and reduces monitoring costs. Iddir networks thus play a crucial role in reducing transaction costs in relation to the screening and enforcement of land transactions. The fact that such networks strengthen friendship and trust among members implies that farmers reduce their screening cost as they have inside information about potential tenants and landlords. Furthermore, iddir networks reduce potential enforcement problems through strict iddir rules and the social stigma and social disapproval through which these networks punish rule-breakers. Table 5 presents difference-in-differences estimates on the effect of iddir membership on labor-sharing practices of households. Column 1 presents the estimation results without controlling for socio-economic and demographic variables, while column 2 presents results with these controls. In column 3, we additionally control for village level-fixed effects.
12 12 Full set of estimates for all variables in the various specifications are given in Table A4 in the Appendix. Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations of equation (1) for household's involvement in labor transactions. The second column includes regional dummies corresponding to the main regions of Ethiopia. Estimates on the third column additionally include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. ¥ Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation.
The estimates in Table 5 indicate that iddir membership causally improves the probability of households' participation in labor-sharing arrangements by about 10 percentage points. These estimates remain stable even after controlling for households' observable characteristics and regional and village level-fixed effects. Conceptually, this treatment effect represents a remarkable improvement in the households' demand for labor and the allocation of excess agricultural labor supply. Intuitively, iddir networks are well-suited institutions for creating paired partnerships and reciprocal group labor exchange through their frequent meetings and group level discussions. Iddir networks not only provide access to potential members who would like to engage in labor-sharing, but they also provide the needed labor at the right time by exploiting the seasonal variation in demand for labor among members of the network. Recalling previous studies on the effect of labor-sharing practices on farmers'
productivity (Krishnan and Sciubba, 2009) , our results indirectly indicate that iddir networks can also boost smallholder farmers' productivity by generating social capital. In this sense, our results complement previous studies on the effect of labor-sharing networks on economic performance.
Finally, in Table 6 we present the estimation results associated with the effect of iddir membership on credit access for households from different sources. Columns 1 to 3 present the estimation results for households' credit access from neighbors and friends, those households who are expected to be members of the iddir network. In the first column, we present estimates without controls, while the second column presents results with additional socio-economic and demographic controls. In the third column, we present the estimation results controlling for village level-fixed effects. Similarly, columns 4 to 6 present difference-in-differences estimates for households' credit access from local moneylenders (Arata Abedari) without controls, with controls, and with village-level fixed effects, respectively. Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations for household's access to credit from different sources. The second and fifth columns include four regional dummy variables corresponding to the main regions of Ethiopia.
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Estimates on the third and sixth column additionally include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. ¥ Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation.
The estimation results in Table 6 show that iddir membership, in the same fashion as the analyses of other factors presented earlier, causally improves households' access to credit from friends and neighbors by about 7 percentage points. The results are fairly stable across different specifications.
These estimates tell a consistent story in the sense that friends and neighbors are commonly members of the iddir network, and hence the flow of credit from these members in the village should increase.
These findings support previous studies in Ethiopia which argue that membership in social networks by smallholder farmers affect their credit access from semi-formal institutions (Berhane et al., 2009; Ali and Deininger, 2014) . Intuitively, this implies that iddir networks play an important role in overcoming households' liquidity constraints by availing potential lenders. 14 This, in turn, suggests that iddir networks can play a potential role in overcoming some of the prevalent high transactions costs in rural credit markets by providing information and security against defections in credit transactions.
The estimation results in columns 4 to 6 of Table 6 show the effect of iddir networks in crowding-out credit sources that charge high interest rates. These results show that iddir membership crowds-out credit from local moneylenders (Arata Abedari) who are often blamed locally for being exploitative by charging very high interest rates. Households who joined iddir networks reduced their reliance on local moneylenders for credit by around 4 to 5 percentage points. These results highlight the potential of indigenous rural institutions and networks, such as iddir associations, for crowding-out other informal lenders that are not perhaps related to the network and charge higher interest rates. This is in contrast to the ineffectiveness of formal credit institutions in driving out informal moneylenders (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Bell, 1990) . This result potentially arises because, unlike formal credit institutions, iddir members have greater access to local information useful for dealing with problems of screening, monitoring, and enforcement, to which formal banks do not have access. Iddir member lenders have lower transactions costs than moneylenders. This has crucial implications for the supply of credit and the level of interest rates charged, which may drive moneylenders out of the market. For 14 One possible question here is whether the three factor markets are interlinked and instead one market (e.g., credit market) is deriving the other market (e.g., land market) as discussed in Ray (1998:561) . To investigate this, we compute simple associations (cross-correlations) among the outcome variables of interest in this study. We found insignificant correlation among the different outcomes in the three different factor markets. More specifically, we compute simple associations between our credit market transactions indicators and land market transactions indicators for the whole sample in Table 2 and note that there is no significant association among the transactions in different markets. This is in line with the previous literature which generally show that direct credit linkages between landowners and tenants are rare in Ethiopia.
instance, Aleem (1990) argues that one reason why moneylenders charge high interest rates is that they have high average costs related to screening and enforcement. We also attempt to estimate the effect of iddir networks on crowding-out credit from formal government sources and micro-finance institutions, but the treatment effect estimates were statistically insignificant. 15 This is of course not unexpected,
given the low interest rate these institutions charge and their supply of reliable and substantially larger loans. This provides interesting policy implications for countries like Ethiopia, which are striving to provide formal credit access to smallholder farmers.
To summarize, the overall empirical results presented above are quite intuitive. The results generally highlight that informal indigenous networks can help the formation of physical and social capital that can improve factor market transactions among smallholder farmers. Our findings are robust to alternative model specifications and explanations. We rigorously attempt to check alternative model specifications and explanations that we think may affect our identification strategy. For instance, some of the existing sociological literature on iddir networks in Ethiopia (for instance, Mariam, 2003) , which focused on specific regions and very few villages, suggests that households who are not iddir members are commonly new arrival immigrants. If such behavior somehow prevails in our data, it may confound the effect of joining iddir networks with some immigration or family (network) formation effect. To rule out such confounding effects, we estimate our models restricting the sample to those households whose household head was born in the village where he or she is currently living. Table A6 in the appendix presents these results. All estimates are quite similar in magnitude to the main estimates presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
As mentioned in Section 4.3, we also test the implication of our common trend assumption using pre-treatment surveys. This assumption implies, that in the absence of iddir networks, both treatment and control group households would share identical time trends in factor market transactions.
Our placebo estimation results (see Table A2 in the Appendix) indicate that both treatment and control group households share identical pre-treatment time trend in factor market transactions, as indicated by the insignificant and almost zero treatment effect estimates. 16 This evidence suggests that the treatment effects estimated, and hence our main results, are not driven by potential differential time trend between the treatment and control group households.
One could also argue that some of the relationships and networks already built in labor-sharing and land transactions might lead to iddir formation, thereby suggesting reverse causality. There are two reasons why such a scenario should be ruled out. First, as discussed earlier, it is important to note that iddirs are traditionally intended for serving as insurance and risk-sharing networks and have been there since time immemorial. They are the most common and stable social networks of Ethiopia, including in urban areas. As such, they are more generic and less likely to be driven by such localized small group labor sharing practices. Second, technically, our identification strategy also rules out this type of reverse causality. We are identifying the effect of change in iddir membership status on change in labor-sharing practices. If the reverse causality is in effect, there would not be a change in labor-sharing practices, and hence we would not find any effect of joining iddir networks on these factor market transactions.
As a further robustness exercise, we also use the fourth survey (2012 survey) instead of the third (2010 survey) in estimating our difference-in-differences equations for some of our outcome variables. We specifically assess the path of factor market performance of those treated households compared to the control group households even at later years. This exercise, for which the estimates are provided in Table A7 in the Appendix, provides two further insights. First, once households join iddir networks, they continue enjoying the benefits of the network as measured in the relative growth in factor market performance. Second, these results also avoid concerns on the timing of the measurement of some of our outcomes. For instance, the question related to credit access spans the last 12 months.
However, we do not know exactly when the households joined these networks, only that they joined after the 2008 survey and before the 2010 survey. Thus, these estimates confirm that the effects of iddir networks persist even if we assume that the treatment group households joined the iddir networks at the onset of the 2010 survey. More generally, many of the results for the outcomes for which we have data are similar to the main estimates given in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
Finally, we carried out several other robustness checks. Compared to Amhara and SNNP regions, iddir networks are not widely practiced in Tigray region. To assess if such heterogeneity can confound some of the results, we estimate all our models excluding sample households from Tigray region, and confirm the results do not change. 17 Although many of our explanatory variables do not vary much across the years, we also attempt to control for some background characteristics such as 17 These results are available from the authors on request.
land, labor, and livestock assets of households from previous surveys to capture inertia effects and initial differences among the treated and control group households. However, doing this did not affect any of our estimates, perhaps because these assets did not exhibit substantial dynamics across the surveys. Finally, we attempt to assess if the effect of iddir networks varies across different types of households. However, we are slightly constrained in performing this exercise because we only know whether the household is a member of an iddir in the village. We cannot identify if they subscribe to more than one iddir network. 18 As pointed out in Hoddinott et al. (2005) and Dercon et al. (2006), households (particularly richer households) may subscribe to more than one iddir, which suggests that the heterogeneous effect of iddirs cannot be ruled out. However, our sampling and identification strategy helps us to minimize such heterogeneity as we are comparing households who have just joined with those who have not. It is less likely that households would suddenly subscribe to many iddirs in such a short time.
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
Using a detailed longitudinal household survey data from Ethiopia, we empirically show that indigenous social networks such as iddir associations can play a crucial role in facilitating factor market transactions. Iddir networks are the most popular and widely available social networks both in urban and rural areas of Ethiopia. The fact that these networks are inclusive, offers interesting context and perspective through which to investigate their role in overcoming some of the factor market imperfections in rural economies. While studies such as Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) investigate the compositional and architectural impact of social networks on economic performance (or agricultural output), we investigate the role of iddir networks in facilitating factor market transactions, which are key inputs for improving the economic performance of smallholder farmers. To circumvent the selection of households into iddir networks, we rely on a difference-in-differences approach by comparing the growth in factor market transactions between those households who joined iddir networks and those who did not, before and after the former joined the networks.
The fact that iddir networks avail information, strengthen trust, and reduce enforcement costs has important implications in view of the binding factor market imperfections in rural economies.
Owing to these qualities, iddir networks can substantially reduce transaction costs and information 18 Note also that we lack data to assess whether these transactions are intra-iddir or otherwise.
asymmetry among agents of factor markets, facilitating smooth transactions within factor markets. For instance, in countries like Ethiopia where land insecurity is a limiting factor in land transactions (Deininger et al., 2008; Ghebru and Holden, 2008; Deininger and Jin, 2008) , understanding the role of iddir associations is crucial. In this context, our results indicate that iddir networks offer alternative ways to overcome land market imperfections by bridging the gap between those farmers who own excess land (in excess of their draft power), and those with excess draft power (in excess of their land endowment). 19 Similarly, we find that iddir networks can improve agricultural labor market imperfections by facilitating labor-sharing practices among households. While Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) without virtually affecting formal credit sources such as microfinance institutions. This is intuitively expected, because iddir members (both borrowers and lenders) have privileged access to information, which lowers the transaction costs associated with their credit transactions. Thus, households' access to alternative, and perhaps, cheaper credit sources through these networks can drive high cost informal lenders out of the credit market. This is particularly appealing in view of the fact that formal credit markets are commonly thought to be ineffective at crowding-out informal moneylenders in rural areas (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Udry, 1990) .
To summarize, given the direct and indirect roles that iddir networks can play in factor markets and other development initiatives, new thinking regarding ways of supporting these networks is needed. As suggested by Dercon et al. (2006) , policy makers may focus on scaling up the 19 However, the efficiency of these transactions has to be investigated, which is a potential future avenue of research.
institutional capacity of these networks without diluting their institutional strength. Although our results highlight the potential of indigenous social networks, such as iddirs, in facilitating factor market transactions, further investigation into how to exploit the potential of these networks is needed. One possible dimension might be forming partnerships between iddir networks and other government and non-government organizations as suggested by Pankhurst (2008) . Such partnerships may be vital in expanding formal credit institutions by combining the desirable qualities of iddir networks with the institutional capacity of the formal organizations. Whichever direction is considered, there needs to be an initiative to tap the potential that these networks offer.
However, this study is not without its limitations. First, it is understood that we are estimating a reduced form equation where the mechanics and channels through which iddir networks affect factor markets are not clearly visible. Second, we only know whether the households are members of an iddir in the village. There might be heterogeneity among the services given by different iddirs, and, hence, households subscribing to different iddirs might be subject to heterogeneous treatment effects. Though not expected in such a short time span, households may also subscribe to more than one iddir association simultaneously. It would be interesting to investigate the heterogeneous effects of these networks and their policy implications. For instance, Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations of equation (1) for household's involvement in labor transactions. Except the first column, all estimations include four regional dummies corresponding to the main regions of Ethiopia. Estimates on the third column include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. ¥ Marginal effects are from a probit difference-in-differences estimation. Notes: Each column presents difference-in-differences estimations of equation (1) for household's access to factor market transaction. . Except the first and fourth columns, all estimations include four regional dummies corresponding to the main regions of Ethiopia. Estimates on the third and sixth columns include 65 village (kebele)-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
